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This paper reports an analysis of the characteristics of political campaign managers 
within the framework of leadership theory. Furthermore, as an outcome of this research I 
will present a theoretical framework for the further study of campaign managers as 
leaders. 
As a research subject, political campaigns have been a topic of great interest in 
recent years. Many scholars have addressed such issues as campaign fundraising, 
consultants, and the media and political campaigns. However, very little scholarly 
research has been conducted regarding campaign managers. In fact, a study conducted by 
Martin ( 1993, p. 10) chastises scholars for " ... a regrettable shortage of material for those 
seeking information about present-day electioneering . . " For the purposes of this 
research, I define a campaign manager as the chief administrative officer within a 
campaign, who directs and coordinates the internal decision making process of the 
campaign (Martin, 1993, p. 96). 
Through this paper I will address not only the subject of campaign managers, but 
the relationship between managers and candidates, the relationship between managers and 
the rest of the campaign organization, and the role of campaign managers as leaders. 
Though many trade journals and news magazines, such as Time and Newsweek have 
reported what are essentially case studies of campaign managers in national presidential 
elections, there has been very little synthesis and generalization of this information to other 
national campaign organizations, or to campaign organizations at the state and local levels. 
Even scholarly studies that do minimally focus upon the campaign organization or the 
campaign manager stress that scholars " ... ought to focus more upon the elites who run 
the campaigns" (Margolis, 1985, p. 124). In essence, I hope to provide a scholarly, 
leadership-based focus on the campaign organization and a very important, but neglected 
actor within that organization, the campaign manager. 
This paper also attempts to offset the tendency in scholarly studies to 
overemphasize the subject matter of why candidates win or lose and under-emphasize the 
study of the leadership qualities of campaign managers. For example, Corsino ( 1985, p. 
252) completed a study on campaign organizations in which he defined campaign success
in the manager's view as" ... accomplishing those activities which would lead to the 
accumulation of the majority of votes on election day." Instead of a success-oriented 
approach, I seek to address what it means for a campaign to be an effective organization 
and the manager to be an effective leader. More specifically, I believe that it is certainly 
possible that a campaign manager may fail to lead his organization to win the election, but 
he can still foster an effective organization that is clearly structured, emphasizes cohesive 
teamwork, and maintains a strong and consistent vision. 
A third motivating force behind this analysis is to integrate the study of leadership 
into the study of political campaigns and to elucidate the leadership roles and functions of 
campaign managers. Given the general paucity of literature that focuses on the position of 
the campaign manager, I do not intend to test a single leadership theory in this research. 
Rather, I seek to isolate specific and relevant concepts in the leadership literature and 
apply those concepts towards creating a theoretical framework for the further study of 
campaign managers as leaders. More specifically, I plan to isolate various themes of an 
effective campaign and characterize the leadership roles of the campaign manager with 
regard to those theme. Hopefully, this analysis will indicate whether the term "campaign 
manager" is a result of cavalier semantics or a true reflection of the administrative as 
compared to leadership duties that a campaign manager should perform. 
In summary, this paper joins the study ofleadership with the study of political 
campaigns. It seeks to create a leadership-based framework for explaining the leadership 
behaviors performed by campaign managers in their efforts to facilitate an effective 
campaign. Therefore, I have chosen the following organizational structure for my 
analysis: A review of the literature, a discussion of research methodology, a description of 
the data that was collected, and the presentation of a theoretical framework which may be 
useful for guiding future research in this area. 
Literatur_e_R.eview: Campaign_M_anagex 
My literature review progressed through two steps. First, 1 reviewed the literature 
on campaign managers and subsequently I reviewed the literature on leadership theory. 
My review of the literature on campaign managers focused on campaign management and 
electioneering. Much of the literature that I found was published in newspapers and 
magazines, and not in scholarly journals and the like. All of the literature on leadership 
theory that I reviewed, however, is based on a survey of leadership-based textbooks and 
the scholarly information included in those textbooks. With regard to the literature on 
campaign managers, I isolated twelve themes that I hypothesized to be most salient to 
effective campaign management and highly correlated with contemporary leadership 
theory. With regard to the leadership literature, I isolated four concepts that I believed 
could best be applied to the themes that I deduced from the campaign management 
literature_ My literature review also led me to isolate four categorical themes that best 
represent what it means to run an effective campaign, especially with regard to the role of 
the campaign manager. I then used those themes as possible criteria through which to 
evaluate the campaign manager's role as a leader or manager within the campaign 
organization and to isolate various common characteristics that represent strong 
leadership and/or management on the part of a campaign manager. 
Several issues related to my analysis warrant identification. First, as noted above, 
the categories/criteria that I developed to guide my analysis represent common themes 
that I deduced from the literature; within the literature I found few scholarly 
generalizations regard.ing the effectiveness of campaign organizations. Additionally, these 
categories do overlap one another, but for presentation purposes I treat them as relatively 
conceptually distinct. I was able to isolate additional categorical themes, which can be 
characterized as follows: Mutual respect and trust within the organization, facilitation of 
grassroots campaigning, the importance of details, the value of experience, emphasis on 
opposition research, level of energy, level of confidence, and ability to control campaign 
leaks. Though I sought information regarding these categories during my data collection, 
I focused on the four criteria within my literature review on campaign effectiveness. 
Combined, the twelve criteria are used to assess the role of the campaign manager as a 
leader, and explain the campaign manager's leadership behaviors. Therefore, the 
following categories are neither exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive, but they do provide a 
fairly representative view of the extent of the work in this area of study. 
Teamwork!Comm1micatio11 
Throughout the literature on political campaigns, teamwork is a consistent 
characteristic labeled as important in defining what is an effective campaign organization. 
Furthermore, the campaign manager is often identified as a key player in influencing and 
enhanciing the atmosphere of teamwork in the campaign organization. For example, a 
post�election analysis in U.S. News and World Report, cited President Reagan's first 
presidential campaign in 1980 as an example of how much influence the campaign 
manager has on teamwork and how important teamwork is as a standard for judging 
campaign effectiveness. During the early phase of Reagan's campaign, there was a strong 
degree of infighting and jealousy among staff However, after Reagan fired his campaign 
manager, John Sears, and hired William Casey to replace him, Casey facilitated an 
increased level of positive and open communication, leading to a much more cohesive 
organizational atmosphere (Sanhoff, 1980, p. 68). 
Other literature on political campaigns illustrate that campaign leaders, including 
the campaign manager, who try to excessively control the campaign may inhibit progress 
towards productivity. One example that epitomizes inhibited campaign productivity 
resulting from excessive control on the part of the campaign manager concerns Scott 
Reed, Bob Dole's 1996 Presidential campaign manager. One aide criticized Reed for 
having excessively controlled the information networks within the campaign and " ... and 
he sought to do it with a personal management style in which he works with two or three 
trusted friends while keeping everything close to the chest" (Dettmer, 1996, p. 8). I 
hypothesize that the result of such a management style is an organization, as a whole, that 
is less informed. For example, the National Journal, cited Don Sipple and Mike Murphy, 
Dole's media consultants, as criticizing campaign manager Scott Reed for cutting them 
out of strategy discussions and refusing to open up communication networks (Barnes. 
I 996, p. 1986). As a result, the campaign became bogged down in struggles over 
campaign strategy, and the advertising consultants resigned. Both elections reveal how 
much of a benefit or detriment a campaign manager can be as a facilitator of strong, 
cohesive internal campaign communication. 
Finally, the campaign manager's relationship with the candidate can also have a 
strong influence on the atmosphere of cohesiveness within the organization, and hence the 
effectiveness of that organization. Returning to Bob Dole's 1996 campaign, post-election 
analysis criticized him for being ". . . mysterious and uncommunicative, often biting and 
rarely encouraging. . . He liked to have competing power centers in the campaign and 
would play one against the other" (Newsweek, 1996, p. 106). This type of attitude may 
result in an unfriendly working environment, and therefore the campaign manager, as the 
chief administrative officer, may be the best person to stop the candidate from fostering 
and reinforcing such an environment. Actions such as these may distract staff from the 
task at hand, running the campaign. An article in a business magazine argues that an 
effective campaign manager can use his/her power and position within the organization to 
at least persuade, if not force the candidate to focus his/her attention, and consider how 
such behavior may have detrimental effects on the campaign (Knapper, 1996, p. 28). 
In summary, literature on the issue of teamwork in campaign organizations seems 
limited and incomplete because it primarily focuses on Presidential campaigns. 
Furthermore, the literature does not isolate leadership techniques through which the 
campaign manager may be able to facilitate open communication, set a positive tone for 
the campaign environment, and facilitate cohesive intra-organizational relationships. Such 
issues require further study with particular emphasis on determining the leadership 
techniques through which a campaign manager can affect the clarity and openness of 
communication networks, improve the team's communication, the cohesiveness of the 
organization, and maintain a strong, cohesive co-leader relationship with the candidate. 
Many of these behaviors may be integral in creating a framework for understanding why a 
campaign manager can also be a campaign leader, and how we know that he or she is such 
a leader. 
CJrKanizationaf Hierarchy 
Campaign managers may play a role in creating or facilitating interoffice 
coordination and a clear organizational hierarchy that is understood by members of the 
organization. In fact, clear organizational structure strongly complements an open 
communication network and facilitates the efficient flow of information within the 
campaign. Corsino's (1985, p. 256-257) study of a mayoral campaign in Massachusetts 
revealed that when campaign managers fail to clarify the duties and responsibilities of 
campaign members, those followers may not understand whether or not there is a 
structural mechanism for the flow of information from the bottom to the top of the 
organization. The present study further explores this issue and attempts to determine if 
there is validity behind the belief that lack of clarity in the hierarchy of the campaign 
organization results in demoralized participants or staff members. Furthermore, the 
question remains as to whether a lack of empowerment and participation within the 
decision making process for the staff will result in decreased staff productivity. 
Refocusing on the responsibilities of participants within campaigns, some literature 
on campaigns has addressed the link between the organizational structure of a campaign 
and the responsibilities of the actors within the campaign. Runkel's book, based on an 
analysis of the 1988 Presidential election, uses Michael Dukakis' campaign to hone in on 
understanding this link. Michael Dukakis' manager hired and dismissed so many media 
advisers that "instead of a few simple themes there was a changing lineup of muddled 
ones. Instead of an organization chart that bespoke clear strategy, there were ill-defined 
responsibilities" (Runkel, 1989, p. 83). In contrast, George Bush's candidacy in 1988 was 
characterized by efficiency and an organization with designated areas of responsibility 
(Wayne, 1992, p. 178). Evidently, when responsibilities are constantly changing, the 
result may lead to dual accomplishments of tasks, wasted time, and overall slow 
procedural processes within the campaign. 
Clarity and designation of responsibilities are not the only important factors with 
regard to organizational hierarchy. Martin's (1993, p. 89) study on campaign 
management compares campaign organizations to diffuse social systems " ... that must be 
carefully structured and organized to encourage maximum participation, and to make the 
best use of the experience, skills, and talents of those volunteers and staff involved in the 
campaign." She seems to hint that the chaotic nature of campaign organizations generally 
may be offset by organizational discipline. 
With regard to the lowest levels of the organizational hierarchy, some scholars 
have isolated the role of the campaign manager in creating and stimulating a large 
volunteer effort and strong fieldwork. This is especially emphasized within the literature 
on national Presidential campaigns, but it may also be important in lower level campaigns, 
as well. Volunteers and fieldwork are important for at least two reasons according to the 
literature on the subject. First, as suggested in Wayne's (1992, p. 117) book on the J 992 
Presidential election, the mobilization of voters often occurs as a result of phone banks, 
door-to-door campaigning, and local fundraising, and the center of focus of any campaign 
is mobilization of voters. Evidence for the importance of voter mobilization, shows that 
get out the vote efforts have resulted in three to five percent differences in final election 
outcomes (Martin, 1993, p. 124). An adept campaign manager may realize this, and 
create a plan for an organization with extensive manpower and regionally distributed 
manpower to facilitate the success of voter mobilization efforts. The second reason for 
the importance of large volunteer efforts is that many experts within the campaign field 
believe that fieldwork determines whether one wins or loses. In order not to 
underestimate the importance of this factor in a campaign, it is important to note that 
within a campaign organization" ... 75 to 80 percent of the full-time staff labors in the 
field" (Sanoff, I 980, p. 68). These statistics make it easy to understand why national level 
campaigns may be easily crippled by poor organization and mobilization of staff and 
volunteers. 
Another area of organizational focus, are the lateral coalitions that campaigns build 
with their respective political parties. Some practitioners believe that campaign managers 
play an important strategic role in building such coalitions. For example, Susan Estrich, 
Michael Dukakis' campaign manager in 1988, argues that organization of state campaigns 
is a major duty of the campaign manager in order to build a unified national organization 
(Runkel, 1989, p. 93-94). This indicates that in national campaigns the effective campaign 
manager needs to have a plan for how the campaign organization will interact with other 
actors within the electoral arena, as well as a plan for the internal structural coordination 
of the campaign. Martin's (I 993, p. 63) study of campaign management techniques 
suggests that the political party-campaign coalition is especially important if the campaign 
wants to attract highly partisan voters whom the party can easily mobilize and influence. 
Poor campaign-party relations can also harm campaigns because many campaigns rely 
heavily on the locaL state, or national political parties for fund-raising and grassroots 
activities (Wayne, 1992. p. 178) 
In conclusion, the literature leaves certain questions to be answered, which are 
included as elements of the present study. First, do each of the above examples of 
organizational discipline extend in importance to state campaigns, and do campaign 
managers play the same role of creating a clear organizational structure and distinct staff 
responsibilities in state as in national campaigns? Additionally, what specific techniques 
and factors become important to a campaign manager in designing an organizational 
structure, delegating responsibilities, building a large volunteer effort, and creating strong 
political coalitions? More importantly, this research explores whether such techniques 
represent leadership processes/behaviors or merely reflect characteristics of an effective 
manager. 
Stratel(ic Vision 
A third valuable characteristic for campaign organizations is a long-term strategic 
v1s1on. Direction is important not only for planning purposes, but common direction 
among the staff also creates comfort for staff members and a feeling of cohesion among 
the staff through a substantive campaign (Martin, 1993, p. 31). As an example, when 
Bush's campaign in 1992 was floundering, the campaign team pushed for bringing former 
campaign manager James Baker back into the organization because he was one of the few 
people who could help Bush create a vision for his next four years in office, and prevent 
him from focusing on his past four years in office (Duffy, 1992, p. 44). The Bush 
campaign exuded such a sense of desperation and need for Baker that it is very easy to 
conclude that a manager with both a plan for winning and vision or picture for how the 
candidate will govern may indeed be priceless to a campaign organization. 
Early planning of fundraising and spending strategies appears to be associated with 
effective Presidential campaigns. Wayne (I 992, p. 116) argues in his book that within the 
structure of presidential contests "having a solid financial base is a strategic imperative." 
Campaigns, especially national campaigns, are so costly and contain such a heavy 
emphasis on expensive advertising strategies, it may be imperative that managers have the 
ability to create long term plans for financial mobilization. The campaign may also be 
incomplete without a manager who can facilitate the presentation of the candidate in an 
appealing manner to both partisan and independent voters. Furthermore, all of these 
different strategies must be set up in phases and be presented as appeals based on timing. 
Wayne's (1992, p. 199) book argues that these phases are imperative because there is a 
tendency of campaigns to become more highly salient to voters as the election approaches, 
and therefore "candidates naturally desire to build momentum as their campaigns 
progress." Overall, this discussion emphasizes the possible importance of a strong 
campaign manager in balancing the attention/awareness of the campaign organization 
between the world external and internal to the campaign organization. 
Along with the above emphasis on stages of campaign strategy, it is also important 
for the candidate and campaign manager to agree on and consistently present an overall 
theme for the campaign. The contrasting Presidential election campaigns of 1996 present 
evidence of the value of consistency. Harold Ickes, Clinton's campaign manager, argued 
that Clinton would be successful because he presented a distinct message to the American 
people and continuously repeated it (Garland, 1995, p. 36). On the other hand, 
Newsweek cited one Dole campaign analyst posing the question "What is Dole's 
message? One day it's the 15 percent tax cut, the next it's Clinton's character, then it's 
back to 'he's a liberal' or 'who do you trust?"' (Alter, 1996, p. 30). The resulting unity 
and confidence within the Clinton campaign in contrast to the confusion of the Dole 
campaign reveal how important it is for a campaign manager to be aware of and focus on 
the need for thematic consistency within the campaign. 
Existing discussions of strategy fail to raise several issues that I will address in my 
research, including an analysis of both higher order campaign strategies as well as 
operational strategies necessary to run the internal campaign organization. An example of 
such a higher order strategy would be the Do]e campaign's broad message, "he's a 
liberal," in attacking Bill Clinton. The specific execution of that message in advertising or 
other attack methods against Bill Clinton would represent an operational strategy. 
Through an analysis of these two strategic levels I will characterize, compare, and contrast 
the manager's role as leader for both the higher order and operational strategies.· In other 
words, does the effective campaign manager focus his leadership skills solely upon internal 
organizational strategy, or does she/he balance that behavior with an emphasis on creating 
an overarching message, such as "it's the economy stupid"? Additionally, the present 
study attempts to identify possible mechanisms used by a campaign manager to influence 
strategy on both levels. Finally, since strategy is naturally associated with both the 
candidate and the manager positions, the manner in which these individuals resolve 
conflicts that may arise over disagreements in strategy requires attention. 
Locus of Mana�ement 
Managers must not only be wary of processes within the campaign, but they must 
also be wary of the candidate. Candidates can become excessively involved in either or 
both the administrative, managerial work of the campaign and the direction setting, 
leadership work of the campaign. For example, one major problem cited in the losing 
campaigns of both the 1988 and 1996 Presidential elections were candidates who 
controlled their organization themselves. Co-chair of the Dole campaign, Lyn Nofziger, 
criticized the Dole campaign because "there was no organization and nothing went right. 
But a lot of that was Dole's fault. He always interferes with his own campaigns" 
(Dettmer, 1996, p. 8). Therefore, such criticism may indicate that candidate interference 
confuses the locus of control within the campaign, and may also lead to hostility among 
campaign leaders. The campaign manager who can communicate well with the candidate 
and foresee such difficulties may be able to act as preventative medicine for problems in 
this area of campaign management. On the other hand, if the candidate seeks control of 
his/her own campaign and chooses a complementary campaign manager, hostility and 
conflict may not occur among campaign leaders. However, in the latter case the campaign 
may not be as effective because the candidate has assumed the overwhelming job of 
running his/her campaign, as well as the responsibilities of traveling, meeting voters, and 
media appearances. 
Despite a need for a locus of organizational control focused on the campaign 
manager the candidate should not be totally lacking in input. National campaign 
consultant, Frank Luntz ( 1988, p. 57), conducted a survey of 68 campaign consultants and 
found that 46% believed the candidate should be somewhat involved in campaign strategy, 
compared to 15% who argued for little or no involvement. These findings based on the 
views of campaign insiders lend credence to the idea that candidates should be involved in 
their campaigns, but that they should temper their involvement. In fact, in the 1988 
Presidential election campaign Lee Atwater, Bush's campaign manager. argued that the 
difference between Bush losing and winning was because "he made some basic strategy 
calls in this race that we might have made differently" (Runkel, 1989, p. 91 ). Clearly, 
most experts in campaign management analysis would argue for a balance of control 
between the candidate and campaign manager as the optimal strategy for an effective 
political campaign. 
Balance may also be an important focus in successful relationships between 
consultants and campaign managers. Martin's (I 993, p. 101) study of campaign 
organizations defined the most effective role of campaign consultants as advisers 
providing specialized assistance in focused areas on behalf of the candidate. However, 
sometimes the role clarity of the two positions can become intermingled and internal strife 
based on control conflicts between these two parties can result. Luntz (1988, p. 64) 
argues that some consultants would even go as far as to purposely undermine the power 
of the manager, exploiting the sometimes harsh relationship between the candidate and 
manager. Such conflict among leaders within a campaign can be destructive and draining 
of productive energy. One of the goals of the present study is to characterize preventative 
measures that the manager may take in order to halt such conflict. 
The discussion above leaves a major question unanswered in regard to who should 
have responsibility within a campaign to maintain a balance of control over strategy and 
management between the candidate and other campaign staff. I would hypothesize that 
the central role of the campaign manager as the chief administrative officer would lend 
credence to the position of the manager as the best locus for this responsibility, since he or 
she is responsible for the inner structural coordination of the campaign. Additionally, the 
discussion above fails to isolate leadership techniques that a campaign manager may use to 
maintain a balance of campaign control between the candidate and the manager or to 
prevent campaign control conflicts. However, before addressing this issue, I must 
examine whether the conflicts described above occur as often on the level of state 
campaigns, the subject of my study. In particular I am interested in determining if the 
ability to manage conflicts among campaign staff, including the candidate, is a highly 
regarded leadership trait for campaign managers. In the end, this study hopes to reveal the 
impact of locus of control conflicts on the ability of the campaign manager, or for that 
matter, the candidate, to enact positive and effective leadership skills. 
In conclusion, the four categories or themes of effective campaigns described 
above provide good starting points for probing the character of campaign managers as 
leaders. The literature pretty consistently shows that at least teamwork, structural 
coordination, vision, and locus of control are important for effective campaign 
organizations and tend to be responsibilities associated with the campaign manager. 
However, even though the literature associates these characteristics with the campaign 
manager, this does not mean that the campaign manager, at the state level, does or should 
be involved in these functions and activities. Therefore, in this study I attempt to 
determine the level of influence the campaign manager tends to display within state 
campaigns. the leadership techniques managers in these types of campaigns use to perform 
their duties, and the sort ofleadership framework that best describes the role of the 
campaign manager as a leader within the campaign organization. 
Leadership Literature Review 
The lack of any previous theoretical framework for understanding campaign 
managers and their roles in political campaigns led me to create a leadership theory-based 
framework for the study of campaign managers. In other words, the lack of scholarly 
information on campaign managers and leadership led me to create an exploratory 
framework so I could study campaign managers through the lens of leadership. Therefore. 
in this section I isolate various concepts from the realm of the leadership literature and 
indicate the relevancy and importance of these concepts to my project. Among other 
reasons, I chose the following leadership concepts because they best test what I believe to 
be imperative behaviors for a leader. In addition, the following theories are integral within 
the discipline of leadership to describe how leaders use power, communicate and exchange 
information with followers. and inspire followers. I also chose the following theories 
because many of the behaviors described within the theories. such as communicating and 
motivating, are associated frequently with campaign managers in the campaign literature. 
Since these behaviors are integral to effective leadership, I believe that viewing campaign 
manager behaviors in light of these leadership theories will effectively explore their role as 
leaders, managers, or both. 
Social Exchange Theory 
Within any campaign organization there are going to be relationships among the 
members of that organization, be they leader-follower relationships. co-follower 
relationships, or co-leader relationships. One leadership theory which applies the concept 
of transactions within relationships and the resulting influence and status gained from 
those transactions is Social Exchange Theory (Yuki, 1994, p. 210). The basis of Social 
Exchange Theory is that leaders within an organization contribute to a group through their 
" ... control over scarce resources, access to vital information, or skill in dealing with 
critical task problems" (Yuki, 1994, p. 2 JO). The result of such a relationship is that when 
a leader or follower positively uses the resources he or she controls for the betterment of 
the group, he or she gains idiosyncratic credits or trust with the group, thereby increasing 
that individual's level of influence. 
Along with describing Social Exchange Theory, the literature I looked at revealed 
a number ofresearch findings regarding Social Exchange Theory. First, Yuki's (1994, p. 
210) research found that leaders are expected to be innovators in their work and that their
resulting success or failure with regard to innovation correlates strongly with a 
complementary increase or decrease in the level of influence given to the leader by the 
group. In other words, status seems to be ascribed to the leader by his or her followers 
based on what the leader gives to the group, as a whole. Other research shows that Social 
Exchange Theory can be used to describe why members join groups. For instance, 
Newcomb (l 960) conducted a study of college men living together in a dormitory in 
which he found that people join groups because of the similarity in values between the 
individual joining and the group itself, an exchange in values between the two entities 
(Forsyth, 1990, p. 63). This finding may very well extend to campaign organizations 
because it may explain why campaign staff and volunteers join and leave campaigns. I 
hypothesize that campaign leaders, including the campaign manager, who do not identify 
with and even criticize the staff and volunteer's political values can cause attrition of those 
campaign participants. 
A sub-area of Social Exchange Theory of possible importance to this study is 
Vertical Dyad Linkage Theory. This theory argues that leaders develop special in-group 
relationships with certain members of a group and that mutual influence between the two 
parties results (Yuki, 1994, p. 238). The rest of the members of a group have an out­
group relationship with the leader, where the leader primarily uses downward coercion 
and distributes rewards to gain followers' compliance (Yuki. 1994, p. 238). With regard 
to my study, important research findings by Cashman, Dansereau, Graen, and Haga (1976) 
show that an individual's ability to have an in-group relationship with his/her followers 
relies on the ability of that leader to have positive in-group relationships with his/her 
leaders. In other words, leaders who tend to use coercion and rewards to gain their 
followers' compliance also tend to be coerced or rewarded by their own leaders. The 
question in relation to my study is whether a correlation exists between the nature of the 
relationships between the campaign manager and lower campaign staff, and the nature of 
the relationship between the campaign manager and the candidate. 
In light of past research and the emphasis of the current study on an appointed 
leader ( campaign manager), it is important to note differences between the social exchange 
processes of elected versus appointed leaders. Past research shows elected leaders tend to 
be more dependent on subordinate evaluation, have higher expectations from their 
followers, and are more vulnerable to rejection by followers than are appointed leaders 
(Yuki, 1994, p. 210-211 ). Despite such differences between appointed and elected 
leaders, there is reason to believe that social exchanges are very important between the 
campaign manager and other staff members. Extrapolating from the political campaign 
literature discussed above, social exchange is important in describing the role of the 
campaign manager because of his/her control over information and communication 
networks, and his/her subsequent ability to empower and influence others within the 
organization through such control. Using the Dole campaign as an example, we find that 
Scott Reed, Dole's campaign manager, would not open up strategic discussions to other 
members of the campaign staff, thereby hoarding informational resources. As a result, 
followers. such as the media consultants, lost trust in Scott Reed and left the organization 
because Reed cut off the informational exchange (Barnes, 1996, p. 1968). Thus, in my 
study I attempt to describe exchange relationships between campaign managers and other 
staff, and to discover the potential impact of such exchange relationships on the overall 
effectiveness of the organization. Furthermore, I try to isolate how these exchanges 
impact the gain or loss of status and trust for the campaign manager and perceptions of 
his/her leadership role. 
Bases of Power 
Sources of power for campaign managers may also be helpful in describing the role 
of the campaign manager as a leader. One categorization of power specifically cited in the 
leadership literature is French and Raven's (Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy, 1995, p. 340-
345) five power bases: Expert power or the power of having information, referent power
or power gained from personal respect and admiration of a leader, legitimate power or 
power based on one's formal position, and reward and coercive power or the respective 
abilities of a leader to influence others positively or negatively based on his/her control of 
resources. Use of this theory is not duplicative of Social Exchange Theory because past 
research shows Social Exchange Theory to be most applicable and narrowly focused on 
expert power. Therefore, use of French and Raven's model of power in this study allows 
for the categorization of the campaign manager's use of other power bases besides expert 
power. Additionally, consideration of power bases allows me to examine the effects of 
various forms of power on campaign managers, beyond their effect on levels of trust 
ascribed to leaders under Social Exchange Theory. 
Closely related to power bases is the idea of influence tactics. The difference 
between the two concepts is that" ... power is the capacity or potential to influence 
others, [while] influence tactics are the actual behaviors used by an agent to change the 
attitudes, opinions, or behaviors of a target person" (Wren, 1995, p. 348). In essence, 
influence tactics are the operational side of power bases. A leader who merely examines 
his/her power bases only comes to an understanding of the type of authority of his/her 
position, whereas a leader who examines his/her influence tactics better understands why 
certain tactics lead to certain outcomes (Wren, 1995, p. 350). The various influence 
techniques include among others the following: Rational persuasion, or the use oflogical 
arguments, inspirational appeals, or proposals made to encourage enthusiasm, 
consultation, or when followers participate in planning an activity, and pressure tactics, or 
threats (Wren, 1995, p. 348-349). In summary, a study of power bases may lead to an 
understanding of how a leader's position influences the leadership behaviors used, while a 
study of influence techniques may allow one to better understand the impacts of such 
leadership behaviors. 
As a group, the research on and application of power base theory reveals a bias 
within the theory. For example, Yuki's (1994, p. 208) study exploring French and 
Raven's power bases revealed that less socially desirable forms of power such as coercion 
may not be reported in relation to leader effectiveness in research because satisfied 
subordinates tend to attribute the more socially desirable referent power to the leader than 
unsatisfied subordinates. In contrast, Warren ( 1968) " ... found that expert, referent, and 
legitimate power were correlated positively with attitudinal commitment by subordinates, 
whereas reward and coercive power were correlated with behavioral compliance" (Yuki, 
1994, p. 208-209). This contrast may indicate that generalizations about a leader's 
effectiveness and use of power bases may vary greatly depending on whether one defines 
effectiveness according to subordinate satisfaction, commitment, or compliance. 
By itself, the concept of power bases would probably be too prescriptive for 
application to this study. While campaign managers may want to use some of the methods 
described in the conclusion of this paper for influencing their leaders, co-leaders, and 
followers, the primary purpose of this paper is to explore and describe the power bases 
used by campaign managers and the leadership influence tactics they use to assert these 
power bases. Additionally, some of French and Raven's categories may not be applicable 
to campaign managers. For example, I would conjecture that the campaign manager is 
unable to use coercive power and punishment on volunteer members of an organization 
because of the nature of the leader-follower relations in that environment. Campaign 
organizations are unique because they are temporary and contain members whose motives 
may differ from those joining other organizations. Many organizations have members who 
work for them for pay or self-advancement, but volunteers in a political campaign may be 
working for that organization solely for altruistic reasons. I hope to generalize some 
leadership techniques used by campaign managers within organizations to assert power, 
the type of power they are most likely to assert, and the impact of the uniqueness of the 
organization on their potential power bases. 
Visionary Leadership 
The uniqueness of the political campaign organization and the position of 
campaign manager provide an excellent opportunity from which to apply the principles of 
visionary leadership. One view of visionary leadership comes from Marshall Sashkin 
{1995, p. 403) who identifies three parts of visionary leadership: Creating a future image 
for the organization, formulating an organizational philosophy that reflects that image and 
practicing that philosophy, and leaders' actions in personal relationships with other 
members of the organization to support that vision. In interpreting these three stages, I 
would conjecture that visionary leadership involves bringing a group from their current 
status closer to an ideal status, or bridging the gap between current reality and 
expectations. In fact, Breckhard and Pritchard {1995, p. 398) argue that during periods of 
change, the successful leader identifies and creates a plan for what the organization must 
do to meet the demands of change. For example, the leader determines if the organization 
needs to expand its employee base to meet increased consumer demand, and where and 
how to conduct such an expansion. Bennis (1995, p. 378) concurs with this argument and 
observes that successful leaders possess "the capacity to create and communicate a 
compelling vision of a desired state of affairs ... " To generalize, these scholars seem to 
argue that it is important for a successful leader to communicate his/her vision to followers 
and gain followers' acceptance of that vision and the constant expansion of that vision. 
Hence, while goals specifically associated with the vision may be achieved, the vision 
becomes never-ending, and is constantly in a state of growth and change. 
Past research also reveals various techniques leaders can use in practicing visionary 
leadership. In a study of twelve CEOs, Tichy and Devanna ( 1986, p. 362) found that 
leaders with high self-esteem and a common purpose with their followers tended to be 
characterized as visionary leaders. Bennis and Nanus (1995, p. 364) support this 
conclusion in their study of corporate and public sector organizational leaders finding that 
many times the visions leaders espoused came from followers within the organization and 
as a result of open communication networks. Since managers may be thought of as chief 
administrative officers for campaigns, one of the goals of my research is to determine if 
some of the same leadership techniques used by CEOs and organizational leaders are also 
used by campaign leaders in developing and articulating their visions for campaign 
organizations. 
Visionary leadership is important in this research because I believe that there may 
be two different visions within a political campaign. The campaign manager may have a 
vision for the organization, while the candidate may have a vision for the office and region 
in which he or she is running. Then again the campaign manager may not even have a 
leadership vision, and may therefore be characterized as more of a manager than a leader. 
Despite the fact that past visionary leadership research has focused on organizations that 
have long term visions, and the campaign organization has a short term focus, the theory 
still has strong implications for this study. I would hypothesize that a campaign 
organization needs a visionary leader or someone who can communicate and gain 
commitment from staff for a common overarching campaign direction. Without this I 
believe that the campaign becomes inefficient and ineffective as staff members begin to 
pursue different goals that at best do not complement each other and at worst are 
diametrically opposed to one another. Additionally, visionary leadership tends to 
emphasize concepts that are also important to an effective campaign organization. Similar 
to the characteristics of an effective campaign organization, Sashkin ( 1995, p. 403) argues 
that leaders who effectively use visionary leadership need to facilitate communication and 
listening to others, consistency and trustworthiness, and self-respect and respect for 
others. Exploring these similarities, understanding the relationship between the respective 
visions of managers and candidates, and determining the impact of the short term nature of 
the campaign organization on visionary leadership are major focal points of the present 
study. 
Tran.iforminK Leadership 
The final leadership approach that is relevant to this paper is the idea of 
transforming leadership. James MacGregor Burns (1978, p. 19-20) defines transfonning 
leadership as leaders and followers mutually facilitating each other to higher levels of 
moral motivation. By moral motivation Burns means mutual appeals by both actors 
towards values such as liberty.justice, and equality (Yuki, 1994, p. 351). Bass (1985. p. 
351} built upon Burns' framework with his own theory of transformational leadership, in
which the leader motivates followers by making them aware of the value of the task at 
hand, the importance of the organization's needs over the followers' self-interest, and the 
followers' higher-order needs. Implicitly, Bass' research focused more narrowly on the 
direction of influence from leader to follower, as opposed to Bums' research on the 
mutual influence between the two. 
Despite differences between Bass and Burns regarding transformational leadership, 
both agree on the definition of another form of leadership. transactional leadership. Both 
agree that this kind of leadership represents a sort of social exchange relationship 
characterized by an exchange of rewards for compliance, or leaders and followers 
exchanging valued resources, but having no long term mutual purpose that binds them 
(Yuki, 1994, p. 352,; Burns, 1978, p. 19-20). Of possibly greater importance to this 
study, a number of scholarly studies show that the most effective type ofleadership 
behavior is that which is comprised of a balance of transformational and transactional 
behaviors (Yuki, 1994, p. 352, 354). 
In brief, transforming leadership is important for this project because it draws 
attention to what binds members of the campaign organization together. It is equally 
important to take note of transformational leadership and transactional leadership because 
they may also be important in understanding the leadership versus management roles of 
campaign managers, and in determining what makes their leadership or management 
effective. In addition, by examining transforming leadership I hope to find what, if any 
role the manager plays in facilitating the grO\vth of the moral values of volunteers. 
Furthermore, I am interested in determining if a manager can be a transforming leader 
within the organization or if that undermines the role that the candidate must play. Finally, 
if the manager is a transforming leader I would like to isolate the moral values, such as 
liberty within Burns' framework, that bind the organization and members to the manager 
in this exchange relationship. However, if the manager is either solely a transactional 
leader or both a transactional leader and a transforming leader, 1 would also like to isolate 
the concrete resources that are being exchanged between the campaign manager and the 
followers. For example, I hope to determine whether or not the volunteers work for the 
manager in exchange for his or her expertise in getting the candidate elected. 
In conclusion, although not exhaustive, the four approaches to understanding 
leadership discussed above appear to be those that are most applicable to the study of 
campaign managers and leadership. In particular, I will use the leadership concepts to 
explain the campaign manager's role as a leader within the framework of the eight 
categories of campaign effectiveness isolated in the campaign literature. I believe that the 
same leader-follower behaviors described by the leadership literature can also be used to 
describe the campaign manager's behaviors in relating to the candidate and other staff 
members. Therefore, under the guidance of the leadership concepts above I will create a 
theoretical framework depicting the nature of the campaign manager as a leader, manager, 
or a combination of both. 
Methodolo� 
The purpose of my project is to create a possible theoretical framework for 
understanding campaign managers and leadership, and therefore the purpose is 
exploratory in nature. Exploratory research is valuable for a project such as mine because 
it " ... assumes the value of context and setting, and searches for a deeper understanding 
of the participants' lived experiences of the phenomenon" (Marshall, 1995, p. 39). Along 
these lines, the data I have used in developing my framework was derived from the 
experiences of participants within campaign organizations and their perceptions of their 
campaign managers. 
A subordinate purpose of my project is to explore previously identified themes that 
are common within effective and ineffective campaign organizations in a context, which 
has yet to be studied. As noted earlier, most studies of campaigns in the past have focused 
on Presidential campaigns, and neglected research on local or state campaigns, opening 
the question of whether generalizations from Presidential campaigns can be applied on a 
more localized level. Therefore, 1 conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of 
participants involved in four gubernatorial campaigns within the state of Virginia. In order 
to prevent partisan bias and to obtain data that are more generalizable, I interviewed 
members of two Democratic campaigns, the Mary Sue Terry and Don Beyer campaigns, 
and members of two Republican campaigns, the George Allen and the James Gilmore 
campaigns. 
Sample 
Within the campaigns noted above I sampled a variety of high and low level 
campaign staff based upon the availability and accessibility of those individuals and their 
willingness and ability to give me information about their respective campaign managers. 
This sample was meant to be diverse and representative of a broad range of views within 
campaign organizations, thus providing a reliable base for generalizations. In order to 
maintain confidentiality, participants in the samples are not directly quoted, only listed in 
the bibliography section of this paper, and their responses have only been used to identify 
thematic similarities and dissimilarities in their responses. 
Interviews 
I used telephone and face-to-face interviews to collect data because they allowed 
me to gain in-depth insight into participants' perspectives on events within the respective 
campaign organizations. However, I must note that because my questions sought to 
obtain the perceptions of participants and because I have summarized the respondents 
answers according to my own perceptions, question and interviewer bias may be a source 
of error that limits the results of this study. Furthermore, these interviews focused upon 
an organization, the campaign, that can be secretive and personal at times, so some 
information may have been withheld from me (Marshall, 1995, p.380-81 ). My only 
method for preventing the withholding of jnformation was to guarantee respondents that 
their names would not be directly associated with any quoted material in my paper. 
Interview Schedule 
More specifically, I created a moderately structured interview schedule designed to 
explore the twelve issues outlined in the literature review section of my project under the 
umbrella of leadership (see Appendix I). These questions have been pre-tested with a 
sample of individuals to increase the clarity of the instrument, and have been" ... 
examined for bias, sequence, clarity, and face validity" (Marshall, 1995, p. 96). The 
twelve concepts which I chose to focus upon included: teamwork/organizational 
communication, organizational structure, strategic vision, locus of management, mutual 
respect and trust, grassroots campaigning, the importance of details, the value of 
experience, level of energy, focus on opposition research, control for campaign leaks, and 
confidence level. Each of the primary interview questions was open-ended so that 
respondents would not be influenced by any interviewer expectations. Furthermore, each 
of the interview questions was designed to test a specific concept or two from the list 
above. 
Jn order to better understand the structure of my interviews, I have outlined below 
the rationale underlying the interview questions. First, 1 divided my questions into four 
subject areas, the respondent, the campaign manager's responsibilities, the overall 
effectiveness of the organization, and the role of the campaign manager as a leader. The 
question area regarding the respondent focused upon his or her role within the formal 
structure, and perception of informational flow within the organization and that 
individual's feelings about positive and negative aspects of the campaign. My objective 
was to elicit responses from the individual that characterized the dyadic relationship 
between the individual and the campaign manager. It was hoped that these questio_ns
wou)d reveal information regarding the leader-follower exchanges between the individual 
and the campaign manager, and the "power bases" or "influence tactics" used by the 
campaign manager. Furthermore. the questions regarding the positive or negative 
characteristics of the campaign were intended to reveal respondent perceptions regarding 
the locus of responsibility for such characteristics within the organizational hierarchy. 
The second area of questions focused directly upon the campaign manager as a 
leader. These questions allowed me to better characterize whether the campaign manager 
was perceived of as a leader and, if so, the type of leadership behaviors the campaign 
manager displayed. Other areas of inquiry, such as the details of scheduling and advance 
work in contrast to the broader strategic vision of the campaign, were designed to obtain 
information that would allow me to characterize the leadership or management status of 
the campaign manager. 
The third area of questions focused on the broader context of the organization. 
These questions sought to obtain information regarding the level of effectiveness of the 
campaign as perceived by the respondents. Organizational culture, vision, and grassroots 
empowerment were the foci of these questions. Among other things, I hoped that 
responses to these questions would allow me to explain and outline the leadership 
techniques and role of the campaign manager as a leader in cultivating an effective 
organizational culture, vision, and grassroots effort for the campaign organization. 
The final two questions were summary questions meant to gamer a conclusion 
from the respondent regarding the leadership/management role of the campaign manager, 
and why the respondent drew such a conclusion about that role. A comparison of the 
consistency of these responses to the respondents' earlier statements enabled me to 
determine whether the interpretations I made from those earlier statements accurately 
reflected the beliefs of that respondent. Consequently, if the respondent's earlier 
statements diverged from his/her final conclusion, then my interpretations and 
generalizations may have been inaccurate, or the respondent may have misunderstood my 
questions or what occurred in his/her campaign. 
A common theme throughout all of the interview questions was that each question 
sought to elicit a response that revealed the respondents' perceived locus of control with 
regard to the concept being measured. It is hoped that each question provided an 
opportunity for the respondent to identify the locus of leadership within the campaign 
organization, possibly the campaign manager. Furthermore, the interview questions called 
for extensive respondent descriptions of campaign characteristics allowing them to 
possibly identify leadership behaviors used by senior campaign staff to influence such 
characteristics_ Though a better data collection instrument may have existed for this 
study, I used this instrument because it distinctly isolated the concepts I desired to study, 
and produced data from which I could draw generalizations. 
My analysis of the responses to my research interviews is twofold in nature. Each 
question was meant to elicit a response from the interviewee through which I hoped to 
discern patterns of behavior within the organization, especially with reference to the 
campaign manager. Therefore, I sought internal consistency among responses from a 
single respondent to characterize the leadership behavior of the campaign manager, and 
comparative consensus among respondents to increase the validity of these 
characterizations. Disagreements on patterns of behavior or multiple patterns 
characterized across respondents may indicate the lack of validity behind that concept and 
its use in studying the leadership of campaign managers, or they may be accounted for by 
extraneous factors that I am attempting to isolate within this study. Conversely, 
agreements among respondents may indicate valid concepts that may be useful for the 
further study of campaign managers' leadership behaviors; however, care was taken not to 
over-generalize from my data, since socially desirable responses may have accounted for 
agreement among respondents. 
The second part of the analysis focused on responses in terms of the general 
leadership concepts outlined in the literature review. For example, if many respondents 
emphasized the negativity of the campaign manager for not controlling the campaign, I 
examined the context of their responses. Consideration of such contexts helped reveal 
whether the campaign manager's actions or lack of action might best be understood 
through the lens of poor transformational leadership, an inability to capitalize on his or her 
power bases, or another leadership concept. 
In conclusion, this project aimed to create a theoretical framework for 
understanding the leadership behavior of campaign managers. More specifically, I am 
attempted to isolate various behaviors that highlight effective leadership on the part of 
campaign managers, and subsequently to explain these behaviors within the penumbra of 
the concepts of power bases, transformational leadership, Social Exchange Theory, and 
visionary leadership. 
Data Results 
The following data for this research paper were acquired through a series of26 
interviews with members of the four Virginia gubernatorial campaigns outlined above (See 
Appendix III). In presenting results, the respondents will not be directly quoted and the 
campaigns will be identified by the numbers 1 through 4 to add an element of anonymity 
to the participants in this research. The data include interviews with both senior staff and 
lower level staff, as well as interviews with three out of the four campaign managers and 
three out of four of the candidates in the four election campaigns. The campaign manager, 
candidate, and other staff members not interviewed were either not accessible, refused to 
be interviewed, or no longer lived in this area. Presentation of the results is structured 
according to major subject areas included in my interview schedule. 
Information Flow and Structure 
The first subject area of questions focused on the respondent's perceptions 
regarding the campaign organization. As part of this section respondents were asked to 
characterize the informational flow or communicational structure of the campaign 
organization. A common theme throughout each campaign organization was weekly or 
monthly staff meetings involving the senior staff Though each campaign had different 
titles for the senior staff and included different numbers of people in their senior staff, a 
general common picture of the composition of the senior staffbecame apparent. In each 
of the four campaigns respondents emphasized that the candidate, campaign manager, 
fundraising director, and a press secretary or media consultant were the members of the 
senior staff. Campaigns two, three, and four also included strategic consultants, media 
consultants, and polling staff, in their senior staff structure. 
It may be important to note one difference emphasized by members of campaign 
one. Campaign one was unique because this campaign organization also held staff 
meetings for each department within the campaign organization, giving an opportunity for 
input from lower level staff into the decision making process. For example. the 
department head in charge of field coordination, or volunteer mobilization, would have 
weekly conference calls with field representatives in various areas of the state. 
A series of questions also focused on determining if the campaign manager was 
integral in facilitating communication and the information flow within the campaign 
organization. The results show that, indeed, the campaign manager was mentioned 
extensively as both a source of and recipient of infonnation. However, the results also 
show that respondents in all four campaigns were just as likely to mention either the 
candidate or the various department heads as their primary sources of infonnation or 
targets of the messages they sent. Many respondents in campaign one communicated 
directly with the candidate because the candidate was accessible and because they wanted 
to bypass the campaign manager. They disagreed with the campaign manager's 
management style and ideas, and also felt like they were 'left out of the loop' in the 
decision making process. Campaign three respondents pointed out the importance of the 
various department heads in the communication flow because they saw the campaign as 
very loosely organized. There was a lack of strict control from above over how 
information would travel throughout the organization. Many respondents understood that 
they had a job, understood the duties of that job, and did that job with little or no 
supervision. Therefore, it was up to each individual to seek out information that he or she 
needed, and the department heads, the only clear hierarchical positions in the campaign, 
became targets for giving and receiving information. 
Respondents were also asked to determine if the information flow was generally 
accurate, timely, and adequate for them to do their jobs. Overwhelmingly, three out of 
four of the campaigns characterized their respective information flows as accurate. A 
common response was that staff members could always accurately back up internal polling 
results done by the respective campaigns with the media polls published in newspapers. 
Campaign four respondents, on the other hand, characterized their informational flow as 
only somewhat accurate and they were highly critical of the poll interpretations of the 
consultants. They found interpretations of polling results to give a false sense of security 
on certain issues, leading to inaction by the candidate or campaign on issues that turned 
out to be imperative for the campaign to address. 
With regard to timeliness of messages, by a two-to-one margin most respondents 
believed the campaign organization to "always" be timely with information versus only 
"sometimes" timely with infonnation. However, all of the respondents who criticized the 
timeliness of information in their respective organizations attributed the problem to the 
inherent nature of campaigns. For example, respondents would state that candidate A 
would attack candidate B on an issue on Monday morning, and by that afternoon 
candidate B would need to have his team prepare a defensive response and counterattack. 
Every respondent from all of the campaigns stated that the information that the 
respondent received was always adequate for that person to do his or her job. 
Furthermore, some respondents commented that if they ever needed more information 
they could always approach the candidate or another informational resource for such 
information. 
When asked about the formal hierarchy of the respective campaigns, respondents 
from each campaign gave similar descriptions with only minor deviations. Respondents 
from campaigns one and three described a structure with the candidate at the top of the 
organizational chart followed by the campaign manager and consultants. who oversaw the 
department heads (See Appendix II). Campaigns two and four only differed in that they 
placed the campaign manager and consultants at the same level beneath the candidate with 
all of the department heads (See Appendix II). However, campaigns one and four did 
both tend to make use of a '"kitchen cabinet" comprised of advisers. or close, personal 
friends of the candidate. These people were not hired by the organization and their role 
was to give outside advice on broad strategic decisions. According to respondents. the 
primary reason for the chosen structures was tradition. The senior staff who selected the 
structure tended to be experienced in political campaigns and had found based on past 
experience that these respective structures provided the best means of coordination and 
tended to be associated with winning campaigns. 
Perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the structure varied somewhat 
across the campaign organizations, but there were some overall similarities. All of the 
campaigns emphasized the importance of autonomy and openness of communication 
within the formal hierarchy. Generally speaking. respondents considered autonomy to be 
the willingness of campaign leaders to allow staff members to be self-directed. Senior 
staff members delegated responsibility to and empowered lower staff members by allowing 
lower staff members to make decisions on their own. such as how each member would 
play a role in implementing the campaign strategy. With regard to open communication, 
respondents indicated that senior staff members were always willing to take their advice 
on issues and listen to their concerns. One respondent in campaign three related a story of 
how that individual almost used an idea by the candidate's driver as an idea for a campaign 
commercial. Even in campaign one, where respondents felt "out of the loop," some 
emphasized how the candidate would call individuals directly for advice on certain 
campaign ideas or to solicit information. 
Oddly enough, even among the losing campaigns, the most common answer to the 
question about structural weaknesses was that "there were none." However, each 
campaign did have its detractors, and among all of the campaigns the single greatest 
structural flaw was the lack of cohesiveness or teamwork within the organization. The 
same autonomy claimed as a strength above was also likely to be claimed as a weakness. 
It is important to note that each campaign had cohesiveness problems in different areas 
and for different reasons. Campaign three, the campaign described as loosely organized, 
tended to encourage workers to act independently of each other, and as a consequence at 
times they would pursue opposite directions, sometimes to the detriment of the campaign. 
In a similar, but more narrowly defined situation, campaign number four had difficulties 
with consultants and their ability to work with the rest of the campaign staff. Respondents 
from campaign four complained that consultants only paid attention to their poll numbers, 
focused too much on national trends in politics, and failed to fully understand the 
character of the Virginia voter. 
General Campaign Characteristics 
The next section of questions focused on isolating common strengths and 
weaknesses across the four campaigns. The overwhelming response was that the greatest 
strength of the campaigns was the people involved. The reasons for giving this answer 
differed widely across the campaigns, but some descriptions were more popular. 
Respondents thought very highly of the level of enthusiasm of the people involved in all of 
the campaigns. In campaign one, respondents stated the importance of a highly motivated 
group of staff members when the campaign hits a slump. This can help the group unite 
under pressure creating cohesiveness among staff members, another frequently noted 
positive characteristic of the campaigns. Similarly, campaigns one and three both created 
an atmosphere void of backbiting. Staff members united behind the candidate, believed in 
the principles of the candidate, and put aside their petty differences. In campaign one, one 
respondent explained how the belief in the candidate was so important to volunteers that 
this individual was able to mobilize volunteers and gain their commitment to the campaign, 
despite a lack of campaign literature, yard signs, and other rallying points for energy. 
Responsibility for creating and maintaining energy, cohesion, and high 
performance standards among the staff and volunteers was attributed to the candidate in 
every campaign except campaign three, where respondents failed to identify a source of 
responsibility. Whether the candidate won or lost, the respective respondents would never 
fail to tell me a story about how fans, volunteers. and supporters would flock to their 
respective candidate whenever he or she came to town. Most respondents credited and 
attributed their candidates with charisma, a contagious vision. and an image of having 
strong and consistent political and moral principles. 
Two positive characteristics were identified by many respondents: Grassroots 
support for the candidate and ample money to spend on the campaign. Grassroots support 
was considered important because it allowed respondents to "feel" the energy of the 
voting public for their candidate and increased their motivation and energy in return. 
Money increased the confidence of the respondents because the more money the campaign 
had the more it could spend on television ads, bumper stickers. and yard signs, thereby 
increasing the visibility of the campaign. 
Negative characteristics emphasized by the respondents primarily focused on three 
areas including the media, field work, and monetary concerns. Campaigns two and four 
both had many problems with the media attacking their respective candidates. 
Respondents from both of these campaigns complained that the media in various parts of 
the state were highly critical of their respective campaigns and candidates, and that the 
media consultants and press secretary for the campaigns were unable to diffuse these 
attacks. Campaigns one, three, and four all had some difficulty with field work. 
Campaign one respondents argued that their campaign manager emphasized media 
coverage too much at the expense of the grassroots or field effort. Campaign three 
respondents complained that the candidate neglected parts of the state, alienating certain 
voting sectors, and lowering the morale of the grassroots effort. Finally, money was a 
difficulty in campaign one and two, but for different reasons. Almost everyone respondent 
explained that campaign two could not raise enough money to put the candidate up in 
hotels when that individual was on the road. This decreased staff morale and hence had a 
negative effect on the energy level of the staff. Campaign one, on the other hand. had 
enough money, but respondents tended to believe that the money was mismanaged. As 
stated above, many believed the campaign did not spend enough money on field efforts 
and did not target important voting populations as much as was necessary. 
Confidence Level 
In general, the respondents of all of the campaigns except number four expressed 
confidence in the campaign and its potential for success throughout the campaign season. 
Furthermore, respondents in all four of the campaigns cited polls as a major reason for 
their confidence or lack thereof Respondents said that polls showed how much the voting 
public either identified with a specific candidate or issue, raising campaign staff morale. 
Respondents also cited the candidate as a major reason for their leve] of confidence. 
Returning to an example above, respondents said they saw how crowds reacted to meeting 
their respective candidates, and how the crowds 'loved' or 'adored' their particular 
candidate. The voters' overwhelming sense of identification with the candidate spread 
within the organization, so much so that respondents in campaign two even described the 
campaign atmosphere as a "family" environment with family members building the 
confidence of other family members. 
Respondents stated that the level of cohesiveness did have an effect on the 
confidence level within the campaign. Respondents from every campaign except number 
two expressed the negative side of decreased cohesiveness among the staff Respondents 
from campaign four cited that the consultants and those advocating the use of television, 
the media, and polls became pitted against those advocating the use of volunteers and field 
work as the direction for the campaign. Consequently, two different camps arose with 
different strategic directions for the campaign, and the ensuing confusion about direction 
was cited as lowering the morale of the campaign staff In contrast, respondents from 
campaign two described their organization as comprised of a tightly knit group of 
confident senior campaign officials, finance director, campaign manager, media person, 
and the candidate. These respondents stated that the senior team served as a role model 
for the rest of the organization. Hence, other staff members, seeking to identify with these 
leaders, would internalize and express the positive, consistent confidence of the senior 
staff 
Respondents from the four campaigns split in their judgement on the effect of 
money on the confidence level of staff members. Campaigns two and four believed that 
money had no effect on the confidence level. Many respondents from campaign two 
redirected my attention to their comments about the level of voter support as the major 
source ofincreased confidence within the campaign, because in the end they believed 
money did not buy votes. Campaigns one and three, on the other hand, believed that the 
more money spent, the more name and face recognition garnered for the candidate, and 
the better the chance of getting votes. Respondents from campaign three spoke ·of the 
sense of increased faith they felt when they would drive around certain areas of Virginia, 
and evel)Where they looked they saw their candidate's name or their candidate's picture. 
Campaiw, Manager's Role 
This set of questions revealed different pictures of the respective roles of the 
campaign manager within the four campaigns, but also some common similarities among 
them, as well. The only aspect common to all four campaigns, according to respondents, 
was that the respective campaign managers were all involved in the coordination or day­
to-day work of the campaign in some capacity. For every campaign this meant making 
sure a press meeting did not occur at the same time as a fundraising event, or that two 
different department heads were not duplicating each other's work. For campaign three it 
meant making sure that if the press people were supposed to send out a press release in 
two days, that this in fact did occur. For campaign four it meant administrative tasks such 
as hiring competent people or making sure that regional offices throughout Virginia were 
staffed with volunteers. 
Respondents in campaigns one, two, and three also indicated that the role of the 
campaign manager was to oversee how money was spent, and not necessarily to see how 
it was raised. The manager in campaign two was always concerned about whether too 
much money had been spent on literature endorsing the candidate, while the campaign 
manager in campaign three was always worried about where in Virginia the campaign's 
money should be spent, Richmond versus Northern Virginia. 
Respondents in campaigns two, three, and four also emphasized the role of the 
candidate in resolving conflicts within the organization. Respondents in campaign three 
described instances where a fight occurred among staff members over blaming someone 
for spending too much on literature or ads. Often the manager would step in and take 
responsibility for the action alleviating the stress of the situation. 
Across the campaigns respondents had different images of the overall role of the 
campaign manager in their organization. Campaign one respondents classified their 
manager as the person who contacted consultants, aided in crafting messages to be 
communicated to the voters, and made strategic decisions, such as how ads would be 
created and how money would be spent. Campaign two and three respondents viewed 
their manager as involved in both the broader strategic vision for how the election could 
be won and in the daily activity of checking on people to make sure jobs were 
accomplished and not duplicated by five different people. Campaign three respondents 
state that their manager would be just as likely to nail campaign signs to telephone poles, 
as to craft the negative ad against the opponent for the next commercial. Finally, 
respondents in campaign four portrayed their manager as the most administrative manager 
of all four. These respondents gave all of the credit for direction and strategy of the 
campaign to the consultants, and viewed the manager as merely implementing their 
decisions. In other words, the consultants would say we are going to go negative and 
create three negative television ads. and the manager would make sure that a time would 
be set up to shoot the ad, that the candidate got involved, and that the necessary staffed 
showed up to the ad shoot. 
With regard to the relationship between the campaign manager and candidate, the 
results show that within campaigns two and three this relationship was one of mutual faith 
and trust in each other. Additionally, most of the respondents in these respective 
campaigns believed that because the candidate and campaign manager had worked 
together in the past, they were able to develop and maintain this sort of relationship. All 
of the candidates had run for office before this election with some of the current campaign 
managers working on those campaigns. Consequently. respondents stated that the 
relationships between at least some of the campaign managers and candidates resulted 
from the trust built up during those past elections. Furthermore, this trust served as a 
model of inspiration for similar relationships among the rest of the staff who sought to 
identify with the candidate and campaign manager. 
Respondents from campaigns one and four viewed their respective candidate­
campaign manager relationships as being based on conflict over strategic direction. 
Respondents cited that the two leaders would argue about whether to focus on television 
or newspaper advertisements or whether to focus campaign activities in Richmond or 
Northern Virginia. The reasons for these relationship problems varied. In one case the 
candidate was seen as stubborn and unwilling to listen to the campaign manager's views� 
in other case the principles of how to win differed between the two leaders thereby 
resulting in constant and ongoing disputes. 
Respondents in the four campaigns also commented on the level of the campaign 
manager's involvement in details within the campaign. i.e. the logistics of traveling and the 
precise timing of scheduled events. Respondents in all of the campaigns split pretty evenly 
over whether or not they believed their campaign manager was a "micro-manager". For 
instance. some respondents in campaign three felt that the campaign manager "looked 
over their backs" a little too often to see if they were doing their work. However, other 
respondents in campaign one explained that the manager did a good job in keeping track 
of how the money was spent. so as to prevent waste within the campaign. 
Respondents were also asked to describe the level of involvement of their 
respective campaign managers in creating the strategic vision of the campaign. Responses 
indicated that the managers of campaigns one and three were both heavily involved in 
determining how the organization would win the race. However, respondents in 
campaigns two and four described the creation of the strategy as a much more team-based 
effort. A combination of the manager, department heads, consultants. and the candidate 
determined which voter groups to target and in planning for media advertising. 
Though respondents did not describe any sort of internal vision that each campaign 
manager had for their campaign organizations, campaign managers did have some guiding 
principles or objectives for the staff of the organizations. This guiding objective was a 
broad principle for how the managers thought the campaign organization should be run. 
Interestingly, all four campaign managers emphasized two simple objectives for their 
respective staffs to meet in order for the staff to run the internal organization effectively. 
The first principle was to never be wasteful, always be efficient, and the second, was to 
understand your responsibilities and job and do it. In other words, if one person was 
writing a speech for the candidate, then five other people need not be doing the same 
thing. If you are a part of the press department, your primary focus should be advertising 
and press releases, not speech writing. 
Similar to the questions asked regarding the campaign manager, respondents were 
also asked about the role of the candidate as a micro-manager. The respondents in 
campaigns two and three described their candidates as either minimally or appropriately 
involved in details. For example, in campaign two the candidate would personally sign 
thank you cards to donors, in a good will effort, to show that the candidate cared about 
people. In campaign one and four, the candidates were also appropriately involved in such 
things as preparing for the individual's own debates, but they were also overly involved in 
other aspects. Campaign one respondents felt that the individual was overly involved in 
scheduling and believed that he or she always knew best which events to attend and which 
not to attend. 
Respondents felt that the candidate was heavily involved in the strategy of all four 
of the campaigns. Respondents described campaign one as the brain child of the 
candidate, who had been planning this race for years. In campaigns one and two the 
candidates created or founded the idea of creating their own field or volunteer 
organization. 
Campaign Manager's Experience 
Overall, past experience of the campaign manager tended to play a tremendous 
role in the effectiveness of the campaign organization. All four of the managers had 
worked on races in the past, and some had managed races before, giving them what 
respondents saw as valuable learning experiences. For example, respondents in campaign 
one stated that their manager had a strong will, was resilient, and would not back away 
from opponent's attacks. In campaign two, respondents said that the manager could 
foresee mistakes before they occurred based on past experience, and that the manager also 
had a second-sense about Virginia politics, having worked in Virginia election campaigns 
before. 
More specifically, the respondents in campaigns three and four felt that the 
manager's past experience had no effect on the media coverage or the way the media was 
handled by the campaign. These respondents felt that the press people and the media 
consultants deserve much more credit for how the media was handled. In contrast, 
respondents in the other two campaigns felt that their managers knew the crafty nature of 
the media and could react well to that nature. For instance, in campaign two the manager 
was praised for the ability to prevent the candidate from attacking the media because they 
portrayed the candidate falsely or in a negative manner. 
Three of the campaigns had respondents who split in their feelings about the role 
of the manager in fundraising. Only campaign four had respondents who felt that all of the 
credit for fundraising should go to the finance director. Similarly, many in the other 
campaigns agreed that responsibility for fundraising went to the fundraising director ( same 
position as the finance director), as well. However, many others also believed that if the 
campaign manager knew donors from past Virginia election campaigns, he or she 
facilitated fundraising by providing an "in" to tap those resources. Furthermore, the 
manager in campaign three was praised for national contacts that brought in a lot of 
money into the state campaign. 
The same split in opinions that occurred with respect to opinions about fundraising 
in the campaigns also was evident with respect to views on the effects of the manager's 
experience on party support. Many people said the manager helped garner party support, 
while others said that the manager either had no effect or actually turned off party patrons. 
The manager in campaign two was often cited as a person whose past service to the party 
made that individual well known among local party leaders in various areas of the state, 
aiding the effort to increase the breadth of the campaign's support. 
Culture of the CampaiK17 Or[.;anization 
Loyalty and dedication, followed closely by honesty, were the most popular 
responses as descriptors of the organizational culture of all four of the campaigns. 
Respondents from campaign three would often tell me about the long days and hours that 
they put into the campaign, but they said they never complained because they believed in 
the candidate. Many respondents from campaign one told me that the openness of the 
campaign and the effort by at least some senior staff members to listen to lower staff 
members helped to created a culture of honesty within the organization. Respondents 
from campaigns two and three also emphasized the degree of focus within the campaign 
organization. They told me that everyone in the organization worked consistently on 
reinforcing the message that the candidate was trying to communicate to the voters. In 
other words, everyone tried to link everything in their work to the candidate's message. 
Furthermore, almost every respondent cited the candidate as responsible for the 
level of honesty, loyalty, and focus within the organization. When the staff knew that the 
candidate was out traveling and not coming home for weeks at a time, they identified with 
the candidate. As a result of this "model" image of the candidate, respondents told me 
they felt as if they were working directly with the candidate and that the two of them were 
working together to win the election. This identification with the candidate led 
respondents to realize that everyone needed to make sacrifices for their organization to be 
a success. 
Level of Grassroots Support 
The level of grassroots support was considered high by every respondent in 
campaigns one, two, and three. AJmost all of the respondents also cited the method for 
accruing such a high grassroots turnout as local networks. Respondents in these three 
campaigns cited how the senior staff divided the state into volunteer-based precincts and 
then recruited volunteers to man these field organizations. Respondents cited very strong 
rapport and communication networks with local politicians as the source for mobilizing 
the volunteers. Respondents in campaign two talked extensively of the backyard 
barbecues held in honor of the candidate. the large number of small donations garnered at 
such events, and the many field events or rallies held. 
Responsibility for the success of the grassroots campaigns varied according to 
campaign. Campaign two emphasized the travel of the candidate and that individual's 
desire to meet and know people as the cause of the high grassroots support. Campaigns 
one and three cited their respective field or organizational directors as responsible for 
building a network oflocal political leaders and encouraging them to drum up local 
volunteerism. 
Campaign four was seen as poor in its grassroots effort because respondents 
believed that it ignored important racial groups in its get-out-the-vote effort. 
Furthermore, respondents held both the candidate and campaign manager responsible for 
the lack of grassroots effort. They believed that the decision not to mobilize certain ethnic 
groups came from the top of the campaign, and therefore they were responsible for the 
result. 
Messal{es of the Campaigns 
According to respondents, campaigns one, two, and three ran solely on messages 
that were very policy oriented or substantive in nature. For example, all four campaigns 
included education, its importance to Virginia, and what the candidate could do for 
education within their campaign messages. However. respondents from campaign four 
added that it also used a more nebulous and less concrete message, the idea that their 
candidate was the best leader for Virginia. 
Most respondents in all four campaigns also placed responsibility for the message 
in the candidate's hands. They all stated that the message presented to the voters was 
based upon the principles of the candidate, and that any outside influence on the message 
was merely for the purpose of packaging an appealing message. For example, the 
candidate would create the idea of promoting education, but the campaign manager, media 
consultant, or general consultant would create the slogan used to convey that message to 
the voters. 
There was similar consistency across campaigns with regard to negative 
advertising that appeared during campaigns. All of the respondents argued, as stated 
above, that the candidates themselves did not want to go negative. A common belief 
among the candidates, according to respondents, was that one should run on his or her 
own record and give people a reason to voter for him or her through that record. 
However, as most respondents argued, at the end of the election the campaign leaders felt 
that they were forced to go negative in order to defend their respective candidate against 
attacks from the opponent, and to counteract the opponent's lies. Respondents in 
campaigns one and two claimed that they went negative in order to defend against the 
character attacks on their candidate and to show that their candidate's record on certain 
substantive issues was better than the opponent's record. Campaign three was the only 
campaign with respondents who argued that they went negative for the purpose of not 
only comparing the records of the respective candidates, but also to set the record straight 
as to the opponent's lies on certain issues. In all of the campaigns, these messages 
appeared to be secondary to the candidate's principle message (e.g. education) were 
crafted by media consultants, and based on reactionary and retaliatory actions. 
The respondents overwhelmingly agreed with the message of their respective 
campaigns. Many agreed because they believed in the principles or policy illustrated by 
the message, but some believed in the message merely because they believed in the 
candidate. In other words, some conservative respondents would agree with the 
respective conservative candidate because they believed in a smaller, less intrusive 
government, while others would agree merely because they identified with and were 
devoted to that candidate. 
CampaiK17 Manager as a Leader 
The final two questions asked respondents to identify their respective campaign 
managers as leaders, managers, both, or neither, and why they believed this. The majority 
of respondents found their managers to exhibit leadership behaviors, followed by a mixture 
of both leader and managerial behaviors, followed by solely managerial behaviors. By a 
small majority respondents in campaign one found their manager to be a poor leader and a 
poor manager, respondents in campaign two found their manager to be a leader, 
respondents in campaign three found their manager to be a manager, and respondents in 
campaign four found their manager to be a combination of both manager and leader. 
Those who responded that their manager exhibited managerial behaviors said they 
felt this way because their manager coordinated the entire campaign and also monitored 
people to make sure they were doing their jobs. Many respondents said the manager made 
sure the trains ran on time and that people in the press department were not doing the 
same job as people in the field department. In fact, respondents from campaign three 
explained that they believed their campaign manager was a poor manager precisely 
because that individual did not coordinate various departments and did not gain loyalty 
from lower staff members. Respondents told me that a lower staff member could tell the 
manager that he or she had lined up 2,000 volunteers for a rally the next week and the 
manager would never check to see if this figure was accurate. 
Respondents who claimed that their manager exhibited some leadership behaviors 
cited ethics, respect of lower staff, and inspirational effects as evidence of the leadership of 
the manager. Respondents in campaign three stressed that their manager embodied the 
campaign's culture of honesty and acted consistently in an honest manner, becoming a role 
model for other staff members to be honest. Conversely, respondents in campaign three 
said that their manager was a poor leader because that individual did not provide 
inspiration for others. That individual cut both senior and lower staff members out of the 
decision making process, discouraging team decision making, and lowering the morale and 
energy of the staff Finally, respondents in campaign two explained that their manager 
showed good leadership because the staff respected the individual for listening to their 
views on issues. Respondents told me that even the person who mailed out campaign 
literature could be heard and would have their ideas taken seriously. 
It should be noted, however, that across respondents characterizations of what is 
leadership and what is management overlapped. For example, some respondents saw 
conflict resolution as both a leadership and a managerial behavior. Campaign four 
respondents saw conflict resolution as being managerial in nature because their manager 
constantly put out "brush fires", or petty fights among campaign staff. However, 
campaign one respondents viewed the same issue as leadership because their manager was 
able to inspire others to cohere on issues by acting as role model and searching for 
common ground when he or she was involved in a contentious situation_ Similarly, one 
respondent might claim that a campaign manager with a focus on winning or on a 
consistent campaign message was showing good leadership by communicating a guiding 
vision and inspiring staff members to follow that vision. Another respondent would call 
such focus management because the manager constantly monitored them, giving staff 
members notice if they appeared to be heading off message in their work. Neither of the 
above characterizations was made by a majority of the respondents, so they should not 
skew interpretation of the data. 
ln conclusion, three points seem evident from the results reported above. First, 
some of the ideas that the respondents saw as positive or negative structural or general 
characteristics of the campaigns tended to coincide greatly with the characteristics of 
effectiveness cited in the literature review. Both the results and the literature review 
emphasize the importance of an open communication structure, empowered lower staff 
members, and a cohesive team among staff members. A second feature of potential 
importance is the emphasis or lack thereof of the campaign manager as a focal point in the 
campaign structure. Respondents mentioned the manager as an important part of the 
hierarchical and communicational structure of the campaign, but they only mentioned the 
manager within the context of a team of other people important in these activities. 
Furthermore, they consistently emphasized the candidate as being responsible for the 
positive concepts of energy, organizational culture, and message within the campaign, 
while the campaign manager was seen as responsible for money management, use or 
control over the media, and relations between the campaign and the field organization. 
Finally. it may be important to note that when asked to describe the role of the campaign 
manager the most popular roles cited by respondents were the traditionally administrative 
tasks of running the day-to-day operation of the campaign and managing the spending of 
money, with conflict resolution being the only consistent traditional leadership behavior 
mentioned. 
Discussion 
The following three-part discussion interprets the results based on the extent to 
which the campaign manager in political campaigns is best characterized as a leader, 
manager, or both within those organizations. I will interpret the results based on 
predictions made within the first section of this paper, outline the limitations of my study 
and provide future directions for further study, and suggest a possible framework for 
understanding the role of the campaign manager as a leader. 
The political campaign literature strongly suggests the importance of clear and 
open communication networks as a necessary condition for productive political 
campaigns. My research findings not only support this argument, but also add to the 
substance of why communication is important to a political campaign. The results section 
illustrated that weekly staff meetings were held in each of the four campaigns, indicating 
that consistency and frequency in intra-campaign communication is highly valued by 
members of a political campaign. Respondents spoke of a feeling of cohesiveness or 
inclusiveness that resulted from such frequent meetings and the ability of lower staff to 
provide input into the decision making of the campaign. In fact, in campaign one. the 
campaign in which respondents felt left out of the campaign manager's decision making, 
the department heads created their own weekly departmental meetings. Though there is 
no apparent causal link between the campaign manager's excessive control of decision 
making and the departmental meetings, it is clear that staff members value communication, 
and more importantly. value an upward. as well as downward communication flow. 
The political literature also suggests that the campaign manager is integral to 
creating an atmosphere characterized by closed decision making among elite campaign 
leaders, or one characterized by open decision making among a11 campaign staff members. 
Past national campaigns, such as Bob Dole's 1996 campaign for President, illustrate that 
campaign managers who have excessively guarded the decision making process have 
created attrition among staff members. Although my results show that the manager is 
important in the communication network, they fail to show that he or she holds the sole 
responsibility for the opened versus closed nature of the decision making process. In fact, 
the formal structures described by respondents often showed that the manager was placed 
on the same hierarchical level as department heads or consultants, and appeared to serve 
as an intermediary between the candidate and the lower staff (See Appendix II). 
Placing the campaign manager at the same organizational level as other department 
heads is important because it may provide indications for describing the role of the 
campaign manager as a leader. Though the campaign manager may still be considered a 
leader, he or she may be best characterized as a subordinate leader under the candidate or 
a co-leader among the department heads and consultants. For example, respondents 
within all four campaigns described the campaign manager as part of a team including 
consultants and department heads in developing the campaign strategy. This team-based 
leadership does not preclude the manager from being a visionary leader, or one who 
communicates a plan for how the organization will reach a desired state, victory. 
However, scholars may be narrowing their focus too much if they neglect to look at the 
importance of the press secretary, consultant, candidate, and other senior staff members 
with regard to the same function. 
As illustrated in the discussion above, some national campaigns have had 
troublesome side effects based on excessive managerial control over information. In this 
study, campaign one illustrates additional effects of excessive managerial control based on 
lower staff complaints of feeling left out of the campaign manager's decision making. 
Therefore, many of these lower staff members bypassed the manager in communications 
and went directly to the candidate. 
With regard to the study of leadership, Social Exchange Theory seems to best 
explain the effects of staff members bypassing the campaign manager in decision making. 
In campaign one, respondent answers showed that the manager refused to exchange 
information, a valuable resource, with the lower staff. As a result, the staff became 
frustrated with their inability to provide input into the decision making process and refused 
to share their information with the campaign manager. The staff refused to give their 
trust, another valuable resource, to the campaign manager. This resulted in both parties 
ceasing to engage in exchanges of these resources. The staff, seeking another exchange 
relationship, substituted the candidate-staff exchange relationship for the manager-staff 
relationship. In essence, the staff entered an in-group relationship with the candidate, 
while the campaign manager lost influence within the organization as his/her relationship 
with the staff became an out-group relationship. 
According to the political campaign literature, another area of importance for an 
effective campaign is the organizational hierarchy of a campaign. The literature 
hypothesizes that it is important for campaign managers to create a working environment 
where staff members clearly understand that they have specific and designated duties and 
responsibilities within the campaign. The literature goes on to say that without this clarity 
and designation of responsibilities staff become confused on how to carry out the 
campaign's strategy for winning. My results, however, show that this lack of clarity can 
actually be a double-edged sword. Respondents in all of the campaigns identified the 
autonomy and self-directed nature of the campaign as both a major strength and weakness 
of the campaign. As the results show, some of the autonomy and lack of boundaries for 
staff responsibilities led to such positive effects as obtaining ideas for political commercials 
from the candidate's driver. However, at other times this same autonomy encouraged 
staff members to pursue independent and contradictory directions. 
Although the conclusion that autonomy is both a strength and a weakness seems 
contradictory, this finding is important because it illustrates the need for balance within a 
campaign. Empowerment and the campaign leaders' use of the ideas of lower staff 
members are positive aspects of autonomy, while duplication, waste, and contradictory 
staff objectives are negative aspects. Perhaps what an effective campaign may need is a 
campaign manager who can use a mix of transactional and transformational behaviors to 
balance the level of control and autonomy within the campaign. It may be important that 
the campaign manager transform, inspire, and raise staff members to the level of influential 
leaders by using their ideas in strategic decisions, such as in generating ideas for campaign 
commercials. At the same time, as respondents in campaign one pointed out, the 
campaign manager may also need to exhibit the transactional behavior of punishing staff 
with less authority or restricted authority when they are wasteful or inefficiently spend 
money. The effective campaign manager may be the one who can both inspire campaign 
staff and check up on campaign staff to gain assurance of their completion of duties. 
The political literature also strongly emphasizes the need for someone, namely the 
campaign manager, within the campaign hierarchy to organize and mobilize a large 
volunteer or field effort. Past literature on national campaigns shows that such a strong 
field base can make the difference between a winning and losing campaign. My results 
support the importance of a large field organization because respondents in campaigns 
one, three, and four argued that the lack of emphasis on field work was a major weakness 
in their respective campaigns, while respondents in campaign two argued that their 
campaign's strong emphasis on grassroots was greatly beneficial to the campaign 
organization. Respondents said that they felt more energized and confident about their 
candidate because of the large, adoring crowds that came to meet him or her at rallies. 
My results also support the importance of the campaign manager in facilitating a 
large grassroots effort. Respondents in campaign four blamed both the candidate and 
campaign manager for not showing concern for important ethnic constituencies around the 
state, resulting in what they believe to be lower ethnic turnout at election time. The 
importance of this finding may be twofold. First, campaign managers who face such 
criticism may need to use visionary leadership to create and communicate a plan for 
mobilizing a large grassroots effort. Secondly, candidates need to make better use of their 
referent power and ability to gain the respect and identification of the average voter with 
themselves or their campaigns. In order to be effective at grassroots mobilization, both 
parties need to work together to create a vision for how the campaign is going to help the 
average constituent and use clear and convincing communication skills to persuade those 
constituents to identify with and "buy into" the vision. 
Campaign coalitions with leaders of the state political party represent another area 
hypothesized as important for an effective campaign. The literature placed responsibility 
with the campaign manager for the strength of such coalitions. Though my results show 
campaign ties with the state party to be important to a campaign organization, they also 
emphasize that such ties should be with the local party chairs within the state because 
those are the people responsib]e for mobi1izing volunteers. In campaign one, respondents 
argued that the manager had poor rapport with local party chairs, and as a result the 
grassroots effort never experienced complete cohesion and full mobilization towards 
victory. Some respondents indicated that when local party leaders do not identify with the 
campaign manager because they view that individual as an outsider to the state, the 
campaign's ability to create coalitions dissipates. In other words, managers who are 
viewed as outsiders by local party chairs are unable to use their referent power and 
influence tactics such as bargaining or persuasion to form party-campaign coalitions. 
The third major grouping of predictions based on the campaign literature fall under 
the heading of strategic vision. The literature proposes that it is critical for campaigns to 
create fundraising and spending strategies early on in the campaign so as to have sufficient 
funds to cover the high costs of political advertising. The results of this study clearly 
show that money was at the forefront of the minds of many respondents during the 
campaign. Generally respondents stated that one of the greatest strengths of their 
respective organizations was the ample campaign funds, which increased their confidence 
in the advertising ability of the campaign. At the same time, respondents in campaigns one 
and two both roundly criticized money management as one of the major weaknesses of 
their campaigns. In these campaigns, mishandled spending was believed to have alienated 
important voter groups, and decreased staff morale because the candidate did not even 
have enough money to stay in a hotel when on-the-road. 
The campaign literature suggests that the campaign manager should play an 
important role in the creation of a strategy for fundraising and the spending of campaign 
funds. According to the results, respondents in campaigns one, two, and three did suggest 
that one of the campaign manager's major ro]es was to be a money manager. However, 
unlike the suggestions in the campaign literature, respondents believed the campaign 
manager's role in relation to monetary matters should be strictly limited to the spending 
side of the campaign. This is important because it focuses the role of the campaign 
manager on administrative and managerial tasks. The managers in these campaigns clearly 
used their legitimate authority to dispense funds to lower level staff Respondents 
described the managers as knowing and deciding where every major campaign expenditure 
went. In sum, these monetary exchanges between the campaign manager and the staff 
were transactional exchanges because the manager gave the staff members money in 
exchange for their compliance on how the money would be spent. 
With respect to strategy, the political literature also strongly hypothesizes that the 
campaign manager plays a role, along with the candidate, in creating a consistent message 
and strategy for the campaign. Campaigns without such consistency on both issues are 
portrayed as being 'lost in the woods' and composed of confused staff members. 
Nthough my respondents unanimously placed sole responsibility for the campaign 
message with the candidate, they did observe that it was important for the campaign 
manager and candidate to be in agreement with regard to strategy. Respondents in 
campaigns one and four illustrated what happens when such conflict does occur. The 
campaign manager and candidate disagreed often on campaign strategy and as a result 
these leaders would procrastinate on decisions, or even worse, the campaign manager and 
candidate would pursue divergent strategic directions. The staff never knew whether to 
follow the lead of the campaign manager or the lead of the candidate with regard to 
strategy, and as a result became confused. 
In brief the results suggest that both campaign managers and candidates need to 
realize when conflicts over strategy arise and take action to better utilize their respective 
power bases to resolve these conflicts. Focusing on the campaign manager, he/she would 
want to use expert power and referent power in order to encourage the candidate to agree 
with him/her. If the campaign manager has the trust and respect of the candidate, he or 
she can emphasize this trust or his or her extensive knowledge on the subject in order to 
coax the candidate into agreement. 
The literature on strategy and political campaigns neglected to address this study' s 
query of whether or not it is necessary for a campaign manager to balance his or her 
strategic focus. By this I mean does the campaign manager need a balance between a 
higher order strategy for winning the election and an operational strategy for motivating 
the staff so that they can make winning happen? As illustrated above, the results show 
that the campaign managers in all four campaigns became heavily involved in the strategy 
for winning the election; however, none of the campaign managers created an internal, 
operational vision for how staff members would achieve this broader vision. Instead, 
respondents discussed two internal principles that aII staff were to follow: Be efficient and 
understand your job and do it. Though these rules seem overly simplistic, respondents felt 
like these rules provided enough direction for them to do their jobs. 
In light of the low value respondents placed on the need for an operational 
strategy, there may be an explanation for why a balance between the emphasis on higher 
order and operational strategy was not necessary in the four cases studied in this paper. 
The four campaigns in this study were all characterized by strong self-directed and 
autonomous staff Hence, the staff became empowered leaders themselves, and perhaps 
they had their own operational strategy for winning. This self-leadership may have 
negated the need for a campaign manager with a leadership-based, operational strategy for 
winning. Future research should explore this possibility. 
The final major hypothesis extrapolated from the political literature proposed that 
the campaign manager has a responsibility to make sure that the candidate does not 
excessively control the strategic direction of the campaign or become a micro-manager. 
The candidate needs to temper his or her level of involvement because over-involvement 
in the strategy or details can detract from the amount of attention the candidate can give 
to meeting the voters and sending a message to them. My results support part of this 
hypothesis, with respondents agreeing that both the campaign manager and candidate 
needed to temper their involvement in details. For example, respondents argued that the 
candidate should have input into the details of debate preparation, but should not be so 
involved as to personally plan every event that he or she will attend. Likewise, the 
campaign manager should periodically check up on the completion of assigned tasks, but 
should noi constantly look over staff members' backs as occurred in campaign three. My 
results diverge from the literature with regard to strategy, showing that respondents 
believed that the campaign manager and candidate should both be heavily involved in 
creating the strategic direction of the campaign. They seemed to agree with Lee Atwater, 
Bush's campaign manager, that both organizational members can make strategic calls that 
can mean the difference between winning or losing the campaign. 
The findings in this area of campaign management have two implications for the 
study of leadership. First, they show that both the campaign manager and candidate need 
to be empowering and transforming leaders with regard to their involvement in both the 
strategy and details of the campaign. They need to entrust, empower, and delegate a 
substantial portion of responsibility for strategy and details to lower staff members, aiding 
those staff members in becoming self-directed leaders. Secondly, these two leaders within 
the campaign need to recognize that through such empowerment, they will be engaging in 
a very important social exchange relationship. By giving up the resource of control or 
responsibility over certain aspects of the campaign to lower staff members those staff 
members become more likely to grant a higher levels of trust to and identification with the 
campaign leaders, raising the level of influence and status of those leaders within the 
organization. 
The first section of this paper isolated eight categorical themes, in addition to the 
four already discussed, which I hypothesized to be of importance to an effective campaign. 
Of those eight themes, mutual trust and respect among campaign staff. strong grassroots 
efforts, the importance of details, and the confidence level of the campaign staff have all 
been implicitly discussed above. With regard to the other four themes, my results 
supported in some cases and negated in other cases the relative importance of these 
notions. My results supported the literature finding that an emphasis on opposition 
research, and the ability to control campaign leaks are of minor importance to a campaign 
manager and an effective campaign. Respondents in all four campaigns never mentioned 
difficulty with campaign leaks nor saw the prevention of such campaign leaks as a major 
strength of the campaign or the campaign manager. Additionally, respondents de­
emphasized the importance of negative advertising and opposition research. Respondents 
only suggested that these actions were used at the end of the campaign, and only then to 
save a losing campaign or to distance their campaign from the opposing campaign. 
The value of the experience of the campaign leaders and the energy level of the 
campaign were areas that this study might have given greater emphasis. Respondents in 
all four campaigns strongly indicated that the past experience of the campaign manager 
was invaluable because he or she was able to use that experience to foresee pitfalls that the 
respective campaigns might face. Furthermore, these individuals appeared more resilient 
and able to 'roll with the punches' enhancing the stability of the campaign organization. 
With regard to energy level, respondents in many of the campaigns named this 
characteristic as a major strength of their respective campaigns. Energy level was seen by 
respondents as responsible for a high level of cohesiveness among campaign staff and 
valuable for aiding the organization during slumps throughout the election. Generally, 
future studies should place greater emphasis on probing respondents about the importance 
of campaign leaders' past experience and the overall energy level of the campaign 
organization. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
A few other limits of this current study and directions for future studies make 
themselves abundantly clear at this stage of my analysis. First, this study merely asked for 
descriptions about the formal structure of the respective campaign organizations without 
probing into the effects of such chosen structures. A study that probes deeper into those 
effects may glean valuable information about the effect of the formal position of the 
campaign manager on his or her ability to be an effective leader. 
Another finding of this study was that half of the campaign organizations studied 
used a team leadership structure composed of various department heads, the campaign 
manager, consultants, and the candidate. Within this structure, this study failed to probe 
deeper into what respondents in all four campaigns cited as the most popular strength for 
all four campaigns, the competence of the people involved in the campaign. Future studies 
on leadership within political campaigns may want to be careful not to focus too narrowly 
on one individual within the leadership structure of campaign organizations. Such a 
narrow focus may neglect to reveal other important and influential actors within the 
organization, fail to recognize major sources of inspiration within the organization, and fail 
to describe important leadership relationships among campaign leaders and the effects of 
such relationships on the campaign organization. 
My results on organizational culture also reveal potentially important areas for 
further analysis. Respondents in all four of the campaigns characterized the culture of 
their campaign organizations as composed of honesty, dedication, and loyalty. Though 
respondents indicated that the candidate, as a role model, was responsible for this culture, 
future studies may want to explore the reliability of this conclusion across various 
campaign organizations. These studies may find that other campaign organizations see the 
campaign manager as the source of such culture, especially if he/she communicates an 
organizational culture through an internal vision for the staff. Additionally, future studies 
would want to seek how the individual or individuals responsible for the organizational 
culture communicate this culture and why respondents in some cases internalize it and in 
other cases fail to do so. 
Leadership theory may also have more to add to future studies of campaign 
leadership. A consistent theme mentioned in respondents' answers was an emphasis on 
the role of the campaign manager in preventing conflict, or "back biting," within the 
organization, the negative impact of conflict on the organization, and control conflicts 
between the campaign consultants and campaign managers. Leadership theory and 
findings from leadership studies on intra-group conflict, influence tactics that promote 
conflict, or the role of misperceptions in conflict situations may provide valuable 
infonnation for campaign managers wishing to prevent or mediate campaign conflicts. 
Along similar lines, findings of studies concerned with leadership substitutes and 
leadership neutralizers may offer important insights into the further study of the campaign 
manager as a leader. As mentioned earlier, respondents in certain campaigns would talk 
about bypassing the campaign manager in decision making processes, the self-directed 
nature of the campaign staff. and the role of the candidate or consultants in undennining 
the influence of the campaign manager. Perhaps such situations can be better understood 
when analyzed within the framework ofleadership neutralizers and substitutes. For 
example, the self-directed nature of the campaign staff, their cohesiveness, and their 
competence may provide substitutes for a campaign manager's operational strategy. Such 
characteristics may allow staff members to motivate and provide direction for themselves 
and each other, with no need for centralized leadership. 
A final limitation of this study is its emphasis on only four gubernatorial 
campaigns, with only a sampling of representatives of those campaigns. Future studies 
certainly need to extend this study to state legislative races and Congressional races to 
determine the generalizability of the results of this research. Additionally, the validity of 
the findings of this study would also be increased if gubernatorial campaigns in other 
states were studied and if data were collected from a larger sample of campaigns and 
respondents. 
Conclusion 
The results of this study draw no definitive conclusion as to the desirability of the 
campaign manager as solely a manager, or solely a leader. Respondents for each of the 
respective campaigns suggest slightly different conclusions about the nature of the 
campaign manager as a leader, manager, both, or neither. Some respondents saw their 
respective managers as merely money managers or administrative coordinators of the 
campaign departments, while others saw them as leaders who resolved conflict, provided a 
strategy, communicated a vision, and created empowered lower staff In light of the 
diverse and varied conclusions drawn by the respondents, the only conclusion I feel 
confident in drawing is that an effective campaign manager needs to have the ability to be 
both a leader and a manager. Only further studies can enhance the validity of this 
conjecture, but my conclusion is that the effective campaign manager is both the individual 
who 'makes the trains run on time' and the individual with a vision for the future and the 
ability to communicate that vision to others. 
Appendix I 
I. Describe your role/responsibilities within the campaign organization.
A How did you remain informed about what was going on in the organization? 
I . From whom did you usually receive information? 
2. To whom did you give the information you received?
3. How accurate was the information you received?
4. How timely was the information you received?
5. How adequate was the information you received?
6. Describe the fonnal channels of communication for the campaign?
7. What were the reasons for choosing these channels?
8. What were the strengths of this structure?
9. What, if any. were the weaknesses of this structure?
B. What were some positive characterstics of the campaign?
I. What was your role in the creation and facilitation of such
characteristics? 
2. How did these characteristics come about?
3. Why did you feel positive?
4. What were some of the negative characteristics of the campaign?
5. What was your role in the creation and facilitation of such
characteristics? 
6. How did these characteristics come about?
7. Why did you feel negative?
C. How confident were you that the campaign organization was going to be
successful? 
I. Why did you feel confident?
2. How did this confidence begin?
3. How did this confidence grow?
4. How did cohesion among the staff affect the confidence level?
5. How did monetary donations affect the confidence level?
II Describe the role of the campaign manager in the campaign. 
A How would you characterize the relationship between the campaign manager 
and the candidate? 
I. What explains the reasons for the nature of this relationship?
2. How did this relationship affect you?
3. Describe the campaign manager's level of involvement in details, ie
scheduling. 
4. Describe the campaign manager's level of involvement in the strategic
vision of the campaign. 
5. Did the campaign manager have vision for the staff and internal
organization of the campaign? 
6. Describe the candidate's level of involvement in details, ie scheduling.
7. Describe the candidate's level of involvement in the strategic vision of
the campaign. 
B. What role, if any, did the campaign manager's previous campaign experience
have on the effectiveness of the organization? 
l. How did this affect you?
2. How did this affect the media publicity of the campaign?
3. How did this affect the ability of the campaign to raise funds?
4. How did this affect the ability of the campaign to garner party support?
III. Describe the culture of the campaign organization.
A What assumptions were important in the decision making of the campaign? 
I . What beliefs were important in the decision making of the campaign? 
2. What values were important in the decision making of the campaign?
3. Who, if anyone, was responsible for creating and facilitating this
culture? 
4. How was this culture created?
B. Characterize the level of grassroots support.
I. How did the campaign gain support from volunteers?
2. How did the campaign gain support from the party rank and file?
3. Who coordinated this effort?
C. Describe the message the campaign tried to communicate to voters.
1. To what extent did it involve negative campaigning?
2. Why?
3. To what extent did the message involve positive images?
4. Why?
5. How was this message created?
6. To what extent did you believe in the message?
7. Why?
IV. From your perspective would you describe the campaign manager in your campaign
as a leader, manager. combonation, or neither?

















Allen, Hon. G. Candidate, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 23. 
1998. 
Allen, R. Policy Director, Grassroots Coordinator, George Allen's Gubernatorial 
Campaign. General Consultant, Communication Director, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial 
Campaign. March 12, 1998 _ 
Beamer, B. Finance Director, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 
12, }998. 
Benedetti, T. Finance Director, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 
20, 1998. 
Beyer, Hon. D. Candidate, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 23, 
] 998. 
Boinest, P. Press Secretary, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign_ March 25, 
1998. 
Bowman, B. Deputy Director of the Joint Campaign, Mary Sue Terry's 
Gubernatorial Campaign. March 18, 1998. 
Brinkerhoff, B. Schedular, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 26,
1998. 
Britton, K. Executive Secretary, Mary Sue Terry's Gubernatorial Campaign 
March 25, 1998. 
Brown. M. Deputy Campaign Manager, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign 
March 22, 1998. 
Carter, M.R. Western Regional Finance Coordinator, George Allen's 
Gubernatorial Campaign. March 16, I 998. 
Clark, P. Eastern Regional Field Director, George Allen's and Jim Gilmore's 
Gubernatorial Campaigns. March 16, 1998. 
Coleman, K. Southampton Field Director, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial 
Campaign. March 11, 1998. 
Elliott, C. State Director, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 18, 1998. 
Fowler, B. Volunteer Coordinator. Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial Campaign. 
March 12, 1998. 
Jolly, A. Assistant to the Financial Director, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial 
Campaign. March 26, 1998. 
King, T. General Consultant, Mary Sue Terry's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 
24. 1998.
1998. 
Olson, R. Schedular, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 18, 1998. 
Platt, S. Campaign Manager, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 29, 
Rimmler, A. Director of Financial Operations, Mary Sue Terry's Gubernatorial 
Campaign. March 28, 1998. 
Russell, V. Volunteer Coordinator, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign 
March 12. 1998. 
Slater, B. Campaign Manager, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 
20, 1998. 
Terry, Hon. M. S. Candidate, Mary Sue Terry's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 
20, 1998. 
Thomas, M. Campaign Manager, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign. 
March 20. 1998. 
Timmons, J. Deputy Campaign Manager, George Allen's Gubernatorial 
Campaign. March 16, I 998. 
Whyte, C. Director of Scheduling, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial Campaign 
March 23, 1998. 
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